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Abstract—A Unique Object (UNO) is a physical object with
unique characteristics that can be measured externally. The
usually analogue measurement can be converted into a digital
representation - a fingerprint - which uniquely identifies the ob-
ject. For practical applications it is necessary that measurements
can be performed without the need of specialist equipment or
complex measurement setup. Furthermore, a UNO should be able
to defeat simulation attacks; an attacker may replace the UNO
with a device or system that produces the expected measurement.
Recently a novel type of UNOs based on Quantum Dots (QDs)
and exhibiting unique photo-luminescence properties has been
proposed. The uniqueness of these UNOs is based on quantum
effects that can be interrogated using a light source and a camera.
The so called Quantum Confinement UNO (QCUNO) responds
uniquely to different light excitation levels which is exploited for
simulation attack protection, as opposed to focusing on features
too small to reproduce and therefore difficult to measure. In this
paper we describe methods for extraction of fingerprints from
the QCUNO. We evaluate our proposed methods using 46 UNOs
in a controlled setup. Focus of the evaluation are entropy, error
resilience and the ability to detect simulation attacks.
Index Terms—UNO, entropy, simulation attack
I. INTRODUCTION
Counterfeit products cause financial damage and are also
dangerous to our health. Every year, imports of counterfeited
and pirated goods around the world cost nearly $0.6 trillion in
lost revenue [1]. The World Health Organization reports that
”An estimated 1 in 10 medical products in low- and middle-
income countries is substandard or falsified” [2].
Industry has aimed to address this problem using techni-
cal solutions. For example, holograms are a widely adopted
method for product tagging and verification. By visually
inspecting a hologram, a customer should be able to verify
if the product is genuine or not. Unfortunately, holograms can
be duplicated and sophisticated counterfeits exist.
Unique Objects (UNOs) are an existing concept (see
Ru¨hrmair et. al. [3]) that can be employed to address the afore-
mentioned duplication problem. A UNO is a physical object
with unique characteristics that can be measured externally.
The usually analogue measurement can be converted into a
digital representation - a fingerprint - which uniquely identifies
the object. The core property of a UNO is unclonability; it is
impossible to construct a duplicate with the same fingerprint.
Using UNOs improves product tagging as duplication is
not possible. However, new challenges are introduced. The
customer now requires a measurement device to read the
digital fingerprint. For a practical scenario the reading device
must be inexpensive and the measurement setup must be
simple. In addition, the customer must still be able to verify
that he is reading data from the UNO and not from a device
or system that produces the expected measurement. A simple
visual inspection might not be sufficient for detecting such
simulation attacks.
A number of devices exploiting unique disorder of physical
objects have been proposed [4], [5], [6], [7], [8], [9]. However,
these existing solutions have so far not been used for large-
scale product tagging as complex measurement setups are
required. For example, Pappu et al. [10] propose an optical
device which can be interrogated using a laser and camera
while the device is accurately aligned.
Recently, novel UNOs based on imperfect quantum mate-
rials, exhibiting unique photo-luminescence properties, were
proposed [11]. The uniqueness of these Unique Objects
(UNOs) is based on quantum effects. These so called QCUNO
can be interrogated using a light and a camera. The QCUNO
responds non-linearly to different light excitation levels which
allows us to implement protection against simulation attacks
without without direct analysis of microscopic features.
In this paper we describe methods for extraction of finger-
prints from the QCUNO. We evaluate our proposed methods
using 46 UNOs in a controlled setup. Focus of the evaluation
are entropy, error resilience and the ability to detect simulation
attacks. Our results demonstrate that the QCUNO is resistant
to simulation attacks and informs us what algorithms and
parameters to use in a practical implementation. The specific
contributions of this paper are:
• Fingerprint Generation: We describe QCUNO fingerprint
generation methods and evaluate these using 46 QCUNO.
Entropy and error resilience are investigated.
• Excitation Response Evaluation: We show that the
QCUNO has non-linear excitation properties which are
required for simulation attack prevention.
• Simulation Attack Detection: We evaluate the ability to
detect QCUNO simulation attacks. We show that attacks
using different materials fail.
The next section describes related work followed by Sec-
tion III describing the QCUNO. Section IV describes the
algorithm used to generate the QCUNO fingerprint. Section V
describes the experimental setup and provides the evaluation
results of 46 QCUNO. In Section VI and Section VII entropy
and error resilience are evaluated. Section VIII provides an
analysis of simulation attack detection. Section IX discusses
implications for a practical QCUNO based authentication
implementation and Section X concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Unique disorder properties of physical objects have been
utilised to create security primitives over the last decades.
These properties are hard to clone and inherent to the objects.
The systems based on the disorder properties can be classified
as Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) and UNOs [3]. The
QCUNO is classified as UNO, as its properties are not secret.
UNOs based on different materials have been proposed such
as paper fibers [4], physical irregularities on CDs [5], patterns
appearing on plates of specific plastics [6], and many more [7],
[8], [9]. Baiet al. [12] use Quantum Dots (QDs) to create
spectral bar-codes. However, this work does not aim to provide
UNOs. Cao et al. [11] describe the use of quantum materials
for the construction of UNO and PUF. The work does not
provide a detailed discussion or analysis of digital fingerprint
generation, entropy or error handling as provided in this paper.
The QCUNO can be evaluated using a simple light and
camera while other solutions often require a complex measure-
ment setup. For example, Pappu et al. [10] propose an optical
device which can be interrogated using a laser and camera
while the device is accurately aligned. Our work studies the
impact of environmental factors (scratches, dirt, measurement
misalignment) on fingerprint extraction. Existing work mostly
does not consider such practical aspects. For example, existing
work such as [6], [7], [9] does not discuss device behaviour
in presence of errors. The QCUNO also discusses simulation
attack detection and resistance which other proposed solutions
such as [5], [6], [7], [9] do not discuss.
III. THE QUANTUM CONFINEMENT UNO
The QCUNO consists of Quantum Dots (QDs) placed on
a surface. A light source is used to excite the QCUNO
which responds with a photo-luminescence effect. The optical
response at each position of the surface is unique to the
intensity of the light source and the arrangement of QDs.
A. Device Structure
QDs are semiconductor particles of only several nanometers
in size. Their optical and electronic properties differ from
properties of larger particles. Due to QDs’ small size where
the radius is less than the bulk exciton Bohr radius, the
electrons are confined and the energy levels become dis-
crete. Confinement effects make QDs promising materials
with unique optical properties such as size-tunable photo-
luminescence, large multi-photon absorption cross section,
fast-response, non-linear refractive index, high quantum yield,
good stability and easy chemical processability [13]. When
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Fig. 1: Power of light emission in dependency of power of excitation
light for a collection of QDs in 8 different areas of a QCUNO. The
dependency is non-linear and unique for each QCUNO area.
the QDs are excited, non-linear absorption, luminescence, and
coherent phonon vibration [14] can be observed. Semiconduc-
tor QDs absorb photons when the excitation energy exceeds
the bandgap. Excitation at shorter wavelengths (higher energy)
is possible because multiple electronic states are present at
higher energy levels [15]. These novel optical properties make
QDs ideal fluorophores for multiplexing applications in anti-
fake label and security devices [12]. II-VI semiconductor-
based QDs offer significantly higher multiple absorption cross
sections with respect to the particle volume [16], [17]. The
higher the absorption cross section per particle or volume, the
lower the excitation intensities needed to obtain a high enough
response with the same amount of material for applications
[18]. With longer duration excitation, the larger non-linear
absorption can be observed. This is mainly caused by the
thermal effect and excited state absorption.
Alloyed colloidal (CdSeS/ZnS) QDs used in this study are
commercially available from Sigma-Aldrich with an average
diameter of 6 nm, corresponding to a photo-luminescence
wavelength of around 620 nm. QCUNOs are created by a
draw-down bar using QDs encapsulated in a matched stable
polymer. The polymer is used to reduce the toxicity and
greatly enhance the photostability, ensuring that the material
properties do not change with time.
B. Device Interrogation
When excited by a light source the QDs of the QCUNO
absorb photons and respond with light emission. The observed
light intensity in each area of the QCUNO depends on the
structure of the present QDs in this area. Figure 1 shows
the response of a QCUNO for 8 example areas. Due to the
aforementioned non-linear absorption the response to different
excitation powers is non-linear. It is possible to measure differ-
ent responses of a QCUNO using different excitation powers.
Light emission in areas of the QCUNO can be measured using
a camera. Each pixel corresponds to an area containing a set
of QDs. Image information can then be translated into a digital
QCUNO fingerprint.
C. Attack Resistance
The light emission pattern of a QCUNO cannot be copied as
this would require duplication of QDs in a way that ensures
the same non-linear excitation properties as the original on
the correct positions of the surface, which, to our knowledge,
is infeasible. However, it is still possible for an attacker to
design a device which creates the required light emissions for
the measurement apparatus: a simulation attack.
We assume that the user has confidence in his measurement
device (i.e. a device with camera such as a smart phone).
We assume the measurement device is not compromised. We
assume the only feasible attack is to replace the QCUNO.
The user can inspect the QCUNO before interrogation and
will be able to identify an attack using an active component
such as a display. Consequently, the only remaining option for
the attacker is to use a passive QCUNO replacement.
A simple replacement would be a printout where each
position on the surface is coloured such that light reflecting
from the surface when interrogated corresponds to the intensity
of the QCUNO light emission. Such attack is possible for one
excitation level. However, such printed replacement cannot
provide the correct response for different excitation levels.
This is due to the non-linear QCUNO response to excitation
light power levels. A simple printout would have a linear
response profile.
To simulate different responses for different excitation light
levels specific material is required. For each surface position
the material has to respond at each excitation level with the
correct light output. This exact behaviour cannot be engineered
by placing QDs. We are also not aware of any other material
that is capable to produce the required output.
IV. QCUNO DATA EXTRACTION
The optical response of the QCUNO has to be translated into
a digital fingerprint. Using a camera, the QCUNO is imaged
and then a fingerprint is generated from the image data.
A. Imaging and Pre-Processing
To protect against simulation attacks (see Section III) the
QCUNO is interrogated using different light intensities. In this
work we decided to use just two intensity levels; however,
measurements at additional intensity levels are possible.
A camera with a resolution of I × J pixels is used to take
an image of the QCUNO at the two light intensity levels. We
use only the red channel of the RGB image as the QDs we
used emit light in the red spectrum. We use information from
the red channel and treat the image as grey scale image.
Each pixel records the aggregated photo-luminescence re-
sponse for the QDs in the area of the QCUNO corresponding
to this pixel. An example of two images for high and low
intensity levels is shown in Figure 2a and Figure 2b for a
camera resolution of 960× 800 pixels.
Next, for each pixel the brightness value recorded at high
intensity is divided by the brightness measured at low intensity.
An example of the resulted combined image is shown in
Figure 2c. Division is used as for two images with a non-
linear dependency the resulting image contains clear visible
features; two images with linear dependency produce an image
where all pixels have the same value (with some variation due
to measurement noise). This combination method is useful for
simulation attack detection as we demonstrate in Section VIII.
Other operations such as subtraction are possible as well,
however pre-processing is then required to normalise images.
Finally, the combined image is resized to K × K to fit
the algorithm for fingerprint generation. For example, if a
fingerprint of 4096 bit is required, the image is scaled to a
size of 64 × 64. As the image is scaled down from I × J
to K × K each pixel aggregates information from a larger
QCUNO area. However, the grey scale value of each pixel still
corresponds to the QDs composition in the corresponding area
of the QCUNO. As the image is downsized, the resilience to
measuring errors increases; pixels aggregate information from
a larger number of QDs and displacement (misalignment of
the reading device) has less impact on the overall brightness
value. This is important for practical applications where, for
example, a smart phone camera is used to read a QCUNO
and alignment of reading device and QCUNO is subject to
some error. Figure 2d shows an example of the resulting
pre-processed image which can now be used for fingerprint
generation.
B. Fingerprint Generation
Once the image has been resized, an algorithm is needed
to transform the obtained emission pattern into a robust and
unique identifier - a fingerprint. Generating robust identifiers
from emission pattern has been studied before. Gabor Filters
are a popular method of extracting data from emission patterns
[19], [20], [10]. However, it has been shown that significantly
better alternatives exist when considering entropy of the ex-
tracted data [21].
Thus, for our work we decided to use the existing AHB
proposed by Ru¨hrmair et. al. [21]. AHB uses an n × n
convolution kernel (see Equation 1) which is moved pixel by
pixel over the input image. In each position the outcome of
applying the kernel is recorded and filtered by a threshold
which generates the output image - the fingerprint. Figure 2d
shows an example input to which the kernel is applied,
Figure 2e shows the output. The output image can be read
line by line creating a sequence of 0’s (white) and 1’s (black)
which is the QCUNO fingerprint.
K =













1 . . . 1 . . . 1
 (1)
All values of the kernel are 1, except for anchor point
(anchor pixel) which has the value 1 − n2. At each position
of the image the kernel values are multiplied with the corre-
sponding pixel brightness levels and the sum of all results is
calculated. The resulting value of the convolution is less than
0 if the anchor point is brighter than the surrounding pixels,
and more than 0 otherwise. This result being above or below
0 determines whether the fingerprint value is 1 or 0.
AHB is robust as it relies on brightness differences in
the surroundings of a pixel. How much of the surroundings
are incorporated depends on the selected kernel size n. The
kernel and threshold operations were applied in our experi-
(a) High excitation (b) Low excitation (c) High/Low excitation (d) Resized (e) AHB
Fig. 2: Image of a QCUNO at (a) high excitation and (b) low excitation. (c) the combination of both images. (d) The resized image and (e)
the result of applying Adaptive High Boost (AHB) to the combined image.




















Fig. 3: Inter-device and Intra-device hamming distances of 46
QCUNO using AHB (kernel size n = 9; 2048 bit fingerprint).
QCUNO can be easily identified as inter and intra device distributions
are separable.
ments using the OpenCV [22] functions Imgproc.filter2D and
Imgproc.threshold.
V. QCUNO EVALUATION
We produced 46 QCUNO for evaluation purposes. A mi-
croscope with 10x magnification was used for imaging. The
QCUNO was excited using a white light, filtered using a
500nm wavelength short-pass filter. The light emitted by the
QCUNO was filtered using a 600nm wavelength long-pass
filter to remove other light than emissions from the QCUNO.
Each QCUNO was imaged to evaluate inter-device hamming
distance; one QCUNO was imaged 50 times to evaluate intra-
device hamming distance.
The inter-device hamming distance is the number of bits in
which fingerprints from two devices (QCUNOs) differ. In an
ideal situation two devices would differ in half of their bits.
When normalising the distance a value of 0.5 describes the
ideal situation.
The intra-device hamming distance is the number of bits in
which fingerprints from the same device (QCUNOs) imaged
at two different times differ. In an ideal situation the same
device should always produce the same bit sequence and the
intra-device hamming distance should be zero.
In a practical setting the intra-device hamming distance will
be above zero due to measurement errors. However, to be
able to verify the identity of a QCUNOs with confidence it
is necessary that the intra-device hamming distance can be
clearly distinguished from the inter-device hamming distance.
In a practical setting the QCUNOs fingerprint is recorded and
then compared to a stored value. If the hamming distance
is below a threshold the QCUNOs identity is accepted. A
medium kernel size of n = 9 is used in the experiment. Kernel
size has an impact on error resilience which we investigate in
detail in Section VII.
Figure 3 shows the evaluation result. The figure shows
the normalised occurrence of inter- and intra-device hamming
distances and their fitted normal distribution. The mean and
variance values for AHB for inter- and intra-device hamming
distance distributions are µ = 0.48, σ2 = 1.6 × 10−4 and
µ = 0.19, σ2 = 5.5× 10−4 respectively.
The probability of false negatives and false positives can be
determined by the inter- and intra-device hamming distance
distributions. Given that the curves represent the probability
of specific value appearing, rather than being cumulative,
integration can be used to calculate False Positive Rate (FPR)
and False Negative Rate (FNR): FPR =
∫ t




fintra where t is the threshold and f is a
probability distribution function. If we assume a threshold
of t = 0.25 (to bias towards a low FPR rate as a practical
setting would do) we obtain a FPR of 3.5 × 10−74 and
a FNR of 0.0053. Other thresholds between the means of
the distributions can be used depending on the application
scenario.
VI. ENTROPY EVALUATION
Entropy can be used to describe the uniqueness of the
QCUNO; i.e. how many unique fingerprints can be produced.
Using the methodology demonstrated by Pappu [10] we found
that AHB achieves bitwise maximum Shannon entropy. Ad-
ditionally, AHB signatures satisfy the properties of binomial
distribution:
1) The data consists of a sequence of n identical trials - a
trial is a pixel being black or white.
2) Two outcomes, success or failure, are possible on each
trial - this maps to black pixel and white pixel after
applying AHB.
3) The probability of success on any trial does not change
from trial to trial - for QCUNOs processed using AHB,
the probability for the pixel to be white is always 50%,
as the mean of the convolution kernel is equal to the
threshold applied afterwards.
4) The trials are independent - as each pixel covers a
separate set of QDs, their results are independent.
This allows us to also use the estimation of Effective
Number of Independent Bits (ENIB) as shown by Pappu [10]




















Generated Data - AHB
Microscope Data - AHB
Fig. 4: Entropy achieved by AHB using randomly generated emission
patterns and emission patterns obtained from 46 QCUNO.
(a) Rotation (b) Transposition (c) Gradient
(d) Noise (e) Line (f) Dots
Fig. 5: Error types used for evaluation. (a) Rotation - 3 degrees
(around center); (b) Transposition - 2.5% (of image width); (c)
Gradient - 100% (corners become black and white); (d) Noise - 50%
(different noise overlaid with 50% opacity); (e) Line (it’s width is
4% of image width); (f) 16 dots (their radius is 4% of image width).
where E estimates the ENIB in fingerprints. µ and σ2 are
determined by experimentation and are mean and variance
describing the inter-device hamming distances. The value is
then normalised to the bit-length of the fingerprint to obtain
the estimated entropy. A value close to 1 indicates maximum
bit independence.
The performance of AHB in terms of entropy is evaluated
using our 46 QCUNO and 800 randomly generated images.
The random images of size 64 × 64 pixels use a random
brightness value for each pixel and are used as input for AHB.
Generated images were included as reference point as these
would provide the best entropy values one can expect.
Figure 4 shows the results. The entropy generated from
QCUNOs samples are subject to variation as only 46 sam-
ples are used; entropy determined of generated images are
smoother as 800 images are used as input.
For AHB on random images the entropy improves with
increasing kernel size; when using QCUNOs samples the
entropy is largely independent of the selected kernel size. In
all cases, achieved entropy values are sufficient for practical
scenarios.
VII. ERROR RESILIENCE EVALUATION
We evaluate the impact of expected error conditions on the
performance of AHB. Examples of error conditions tested are
shown in Figure 5 which focuses on three aspects: misalign-
ment with the reading device (5a, 5b), variations in lighting
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Fig. 6: The effect of different error types on QCUNO fingerprints
from Generated Data (GD) and Microscope Data (MD). The impact
of kernel size n on error is dependant on the error type.
conditions (5c, 5d) and damages of the QCUNO (5e, 5f).
For this evaluation we use generated images as before for
QCUNO-independent AHB evaluation, as well as image data
obtained from our sample QCUNOs.
We compare fingerprints obtained from images with finger-
prints generated from the same image after introduction of
an error condition. The measured hamming distance of the
fingerprints indicates how severe the error impact is on the
fingerprint.
Figure 6 shows the impact of different errors on hamming
distance when using AHB with different kernel sizes.
The trend is similar when comparing generated images and
QCUNO samples. However, for some error cases hamming
distances obtained from generated images are more affected
(e.g. rotation and transportation).
An increase of the kernel size reduces rotation and trans-
position errors, but increases gradient, line and dot errors. In
other words, higher kernel sizes are better for tolerating errors
induced by misalignment with measurement equipment, while
lower sizes are better in case the QCUNO is damaged or
lighting conditions are affected.
Thus, the kernel size should be selected according to the
type of errors that are likely to be encountered.
VIII. SIMULATION ATTACK RESISTANCE
Resistance to simulation attacks is an essential quality of the
QCUNO. To demonstrate this feature we create 15 QCUNO
replacements by printing a tag on paper with a regular printer.
We then image these replacements and analyse inter and
intra-device hamming distances. The result of this analysis




















Fig. 7: Results from reading printed paper (Simulation attack). Inter-
device and intra-device distributions cannot be distinguished.
is shown in Figure 7. The replacements provide a linear
response in terms of excitation power and the brightness read,
as they do not posses the non-linear excitation properties of the
QCUNO. Therefore, dividing the images at different excitation
levels provides a constant pixel value throughout the resulting
picture, and the fingerprint is determined by noise. This causes
the results in Figure 7, where the replacements cannot provide
a stable fingerprint. It is demonstrated that the paper based
simulation attack is not feasible under the given conditions.
It has to be noted that we did not aim to simulate the
output of a specific QCUNO. It is not possible to create any
useful output using a printed replacement, let alone the specific
output created by a QCUNO.
IX. PRACTICAL IMPLEMENTATION
The QCUNO has properties that make it particularly suit-
able for large-scale deployments where inexpensive devices
such as a mobile phone are used for scanning:
1) As the QCUNO is two-dimensional and the emission
pattern is omni-directional, the camera measuring the
device does not have to be fixed in a specific location in
relation to the QCUNO. Instead, fiducials can be placed
around the QCUNO to detect and stretch the image into
a consistent format before processing.
2) Because the security relies on multiple excitation levels
(as opposed to microscopic readout precision), the area
covered by each pixel can be larger and, therefore, can
be detected by a cheaper device.
In practice, the QCUNO will be detected using fiducials
and will provide meta-data via additional markers such as a
QR code. We are currently working on a reading device based
on a mobile phone. Our next step is to evaluate interrogation
of QCUNOs using this device. In this setting the QCUNO is
identified using fiducials and corrections for perspective and
orientation must be applied before processing as described in
this paper can be used.
X. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have shown how fingerprints can be
generated from a QCUNO. We used a controlled set-up for
performing experiments to prove that the QCUNO has non-
linear excitation properties that can be used for security. The
fingerprints provide intra and inter-device hamming distances
that allow us to clearly identify QCUNOs. We have described
achievable entropy and have shown how the algorithms for
fingerprint extraction perform in error situations. We have also
shown that the QCUNO prevents simulation attacks.
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